Manual: systemd-cryptenroll
SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1) systemd-cryptenroll SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)
NAME
systemd-cryptenroll - Enroll PKCS#11, FIDO2, TPM2 token/devices to LUKS2 encrypted volumes
SYNOPSIS
systemd-cryptenroll [OPTIONS...] [DEVICE]
DESCRIPTION
systemd-cryptenroll is a tool for enrolling hardware security tokens and devices into a LUKS2 encrypted volume, which
may then be used to unlock the volume during boot. Specifically, it supports tokens and credentials of the following
kind to be enrolled:
1. PKCS#11 security tokens and smartcards that may carry an RSA or EC key pair (e.g. various YubiKeys)
2. FIDO2 security tokens that implement the "hmac-secret" extension (most FIDO2 keys, including YubiKeys)
3. TPM2 security devices
4. Regular passphrases
5. Recovery keys. These are similar to regular passphrases, however are randomly generated on the computer and thus
generally have higher entropy than user-chosen passphrases. Their character set has been designed to ensure they
are easy to type in, while having high entropy. They may also be scanned off screen using QR codes. Recovery keys
may be used for unlocking LUKS2 volumes wherever passphrases are accepted. They are intended to be used in
combination with an enrolled hardware security token, as a recovery option when the token is lost.
In addition, the tool may be used to enumerate currently enrolled security tokens and wipe a subset of them. The
latter may be combined with the enrollment operation of a new security token, in order to update or replace
enrollments.
The tool supports only LUKS2 volumes, as it stores token meta-information in the LUKS2 JSON token area, which is not
available in other encryption formats.
systemd-cryptsetup operates on the device backing /var/ if no device is specified explicitly, and no wipe operation
is requested. (Note that in the typical case where /var/ is on the same file system as the root file system, this
hence enrolls a key into the backing device of the root file system.)
TPM2 PCRs and policies
PCRs allow binding of the encryption of secrets to specific software versions and system state, so that the enrolled
key is only accessible (may be "unsealed") if specific trusted software and/or configuration is used. Such bindings
may be created with the option --tpm2-pcrs= described below.
Secrets may also be bound indirectly: a signed policy for a state of some combination of PCR values is provided, and
the secret is bound to the public part of the key used to sign this policy. This means that the owner of a key can
generate a sequence of signed policies, for specific software versions and system states, and the secret can be
decrypted as long as the machine state matches one of those policies. For example, a vendor may provide such a policy
for each kernel+initrd update, allowing users to encrypt secrets so that they can be decrypted when running any
kernel+initrd signed by the vendor. Such bindings may be created with the options --tpm2-public-key=,
--tpm2-public-key-pcrs=, --tpm2-signature= described below.
See UAPI.7 Linux TPM PCR Registry[1] for an authoritative list of PCRs and how they are updated. The table below
contains a quick reference, describing in particular the PCRs modified by systemd.
Table 1. Well-known PCR Definitions
┌─────┬─────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┐
│ PCR │ name │ Explanation │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 0 │ platform-code │ Core system firmware executable │
│ │ │ code; changes on firmware │
│ │ │ updates │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 1 │ platform-config │ Core system firmware data/host │
│ │ │ platform configuration; │
│ │ │ typically contains serial and │
│ │ │ model numbers, changes on basic │
│ │ │ hardware/CPU/RAM replacements │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2 │ external-code │ Extended or pluggable │
│ │ │ executable code; includes │
│ │ │ option ROMs on pluggable │
│ │ │ hardware │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 3 │ external-config │ Extended or pluggable firmware │
│ │ │ data; includes information │
│ │ │ about pluggable hardware │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 4 │ boot-loader-code │ Boot loader and additional │
│ │ │ drivers, PE binaries invoked by │
│ │ │ the boot loader; changes on │
│ │ │ boot loader updates. sd-stub(7) │
│ │ │ measures system extension │
│ │ │ images read from the ESP here │
│ │ │ too (see systemd-sysext(8)). │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 5 │ boot-loader-config │ GPT/Partition table; changes │
│ │ │ when the partitions are added, │
│ │ │ modified, or removed │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 7 │ secure-boot-policy │ Secure Boot state; changes when │
│ │ │ UEFI SecureBoot mode is │
│ │ │ enabled/disabled, or firmware │
│ │ │ certificates (PK, KEK, db, dbx, │
│ │ │ ...) changes. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 9 │ kernel-initrd │ The Linux kernel measures all │
│ │ │ initrds it receives into this │
│ │ │ PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 10 │ ima │ The IMA project measures its │
│ │ │ runtime state into this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 11 │ kernel-boot │ systemd-stub(7) measures the │
│ │ │ ELF kernel image, embedded │
│ │ │ initrd and other payload of the │
│ │ │ PE image it is placed in into │
│ │ │ this PCR. systemd- │
│ │ │ pcrphase.service(8) measures │
│ │ │ boot phase strings into this │
│ │ │ PCR at various milestones of │
│ │ │ the boot process. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 12 │ kernel-config │ systemd-boot(7) measures the │
│ │ │ kernel command line into this │
│ │ │ PCR. systemd-stub(7) measures │
│ │ │ any manually specified kernel │
│ │ │ command line (i.e. a kernel │
│ │ │ command line that overrides the │
│ │ │ one embedded in the unified PE │
│ │ │ image) and loaded credentials │
│ │ │ into this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 13 │ sysexts │ systemd-stub(7) measures any │
│ │ │ systemd-sysext(8) images it │
│ │ │ passes to the booted kernel │
│ │ │ into this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 14 │ shim-policy │ The shim project measures its │
│ │ │ "MOK" certificates and hashes │
│ │ │ into this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 15 │ system-identity │ systemd-cryptsetup(8) │
│ │ │ optionally measures the volume │
│ │ │ key of activated LUKS volumes │
│ │ │ into this PCR. systemd- │
│ │ │ pcrmachine.service(8) measures │
│ │ │ the machine-id(5) into this │
│ │ │ PCR. systemd-pcrfs@.service(8) │
│ │ │ measures mount points, file │
│ │ │ system UUIDs, labels, partition │
│ │ │ UUIDs of the root and /var/ │
│ │ │ filesystems into this PCR. │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 16 │ debug │ Debug │
├─────┼─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤
│ 23 │ application-support │ Application Support │
└─────┴─────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────┘
In general, encrypted volumes would be bound to some combination of PCRs 7, 11, and 14 (if shim/MOK is used). In
order to allow firmware and OS version updates, it is typically not advisable to use PCRs such as 0 and 2, since the
program code they cover should already be covered indirectly through the certificates measured into PCR 7. Validation
through certificates hashes is typically preferable over validation through direct measurements as it is less brittle
in context of OS/firmware updates: the measurements will change on every update, but signatures should remain
unchanged. See the UAPI.7 Linux TPM PCR Registry[1] for more discussion.
LIMITATIONS
Note that currently when enrolling a new key of one of the five supported types listed above, it is required to first
provide a passphrase, a recovery key, a FIDO2 token, or a TPM2 key. It's currently not supported to unlock a device
with a PKCS#11 key in order to enroll a new PKCS#11 key. Thus, if in future key roll-over is desired it is generally
recommended to ensure a passphrase, a recovery key, a FIDO2 token, or a TPM2 key is always enrolled.
Also note that support for enrolling multiple FIDO2 tokens is currently limited. When multiple FIDO2 tokens are
enrolled, systemd-cryptsetup will perform pre-flight requests to attempt to identify which of the enrolled tokens are
currently plugged in. However, this is not possible for FIDO2 tokens with user verification (UV, usually via
biometrics), in which case it will fall back to attempting each enrolled token one by one. This will result in
multiple prompts for PIN and user verification. This limitation does not apply to PKCS#11 tokens.
COMPATIBILITY
Security technology both in systemd and in the general industry constantly evolves. In order to provide best security
guarantees, the way TPM2, FIDO2, PKCS#11 devices are enrolled is regularly updated in newer versions of systemd.
Whenever this happens the following compatibility guarantees are given:
• Old enrollments continue to be supported and may be unlocked with newer versions of systemd-
cryptsetup@.service(8).
• The opposite is not guaranteed however: it might not be possible to unlock volumes with enrollments done with a
newer version of systemd-cryptenroll with an older version of systemd-cryptsetup.
That said, it is generally recommended to use matching versions of systemd-cryptenroll and systemd-cryptsetup, since
this is best tested and supported.
It might be advisable to re-enroll existing enrollments to take benefit of newer security features, as they are added
to systemd.
UNLOCKING
The following options are understood that may be used to unlock the device in preparation of the enrollment
operations:
--unlock-key-file=PATH
Use a file instead of a password/passphrase read from stdin to unlock the volume. Expects the PATH to the file
containing your key to unlock the volume. Currently there is nothing like --key-file-offset= or --key-file-size=
so this file has to only contain the full key.
Added in version 252.
--unlock-fido2-device=PATH
Use a FIDO2 device instead of a password/passphrase read from stdin to unlock the volume. Expects a hidraw device
referring to the FIDO2 device (e.g. /dev/hidraw1). Alternatively the special value "auto" may be specified, in
order to automatically determine the device node of a currently plugged in security token (of which there must be
exactly one). This automatic discovery is unsupported if --fido2-device= option is also specified. Note that
currently FIDO2 devices enrolled without an accompanying LUKS2 token (i.e. --fido2-parameters-in-header=no)
cannot be used for unlocking.
Added in version 253.
--unlock-tpm2-device=PATH
Use a TPM2 device instead of a password/passphrase read from stdin to unlock the volume. Expects a device node
path referring to the TPM2 chip (e.g. /dev/tpmrm0). Alternatively the special value "auto" may be specified, in
order to automatically determine the device node of a currently discovered TPM2 device (of which there must be
exactly one).
Added in version 256.
SIMPLE ENROLLMENT
The following options are understood that may be used to enroll simple user input based unlocking:
--password
Enroll a regular password/passphrase. This command is mostly equivalent to cryptsetup luksAddKey, however may be
combined with --wipe-slot= in one call, see below.
Added in version 248.
--recovery-key
Enroll a recovery key. Recovery keys are mostly identical to passphrases, but are computer-generated instead of
being chosen by a human, and thus have a guaranteed high entropy. The key uses a character set that is easy to
type in, and may be scanned off screen via a QR code.
Added in version 248.
PKCS#11 ENROLLMENT
The following option is understood that may be used to enroll PKCS#11 tokens:
--pkcs11-token-uri=URI
Enroll a PKCS#11 security token or smartcard (e.g. a YubiKey). Expects a PKCS#11 URI that allows finding an X.509
certificate or a public key on the token. The URI must also be suitable to find a related private key after
changing the type of object in it. Alternatively the special value "auto" may be specified, in order to
automatically determine the suitable URI if a single security token containing a single key pair is plugged in.
The special value "list" may be used to enumerate all suitable PKCS#11 tokens currently plugged in.
The PKCS#11 token must contain an RSA or EC key pair which will be used to unlock a LUKS2 volume. For RSA, a
randomly generated volume key is encrypted with a public key in the token, and stored in the LUKS2 JSON token
header area. To unlock a volume, the stored encrypted volume key will be decrypted with a private key in the
token. For ECC, ECDH algorithm is used: we generate a pair of EC keys in the same EC group, then derive a shared
secret using the generated private key and the public key in the token. The derived shared secret is used as a
volume key. The generated public key is stored in the LUKS2 JSON token header area. The generated private key is
erased. To unlock a volume, we derive the shared secret with the stored public key and a private key in the
token.
In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled PKCS#11 security token, specify the pkcs11-uri= option in the
respective /etc/crypttab line:
myvolume /dev/sda1 none pkcs11-uri=auto
See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching
/etc/crypttab line.
Added in version 248.
FIDO2 ENROLLMENT
The following options are understood that may be used to enroll FIDO2 tokens:
--fido2-device=PATH
Enroll a FIDO2 security token that implements the "hmac-secret" extension (e.g. a YubiKey). Expects a hidraw
device referring to the FIDO2 device (e.g. /dev/hidraw1). Alternatively the special value "auto" may be
specified, in order to automatically determine the device node of a currently plugged in security token (of which
there must be exactly one). This automatic discovery is unsupported if --unlock-fido2-device= option is also
specified. The special value "list" may be used to enumerate all suitable FIDO2 tokens currently plugged in. Note
that many hardware security tokens that implement FIDO2 also implement the older PKCS#11 standard. Typically
FIDO2 is preferable, given it is simpler to use and more modern.
In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled FIDO2 security token, specify the fido2-device= option in the
respective /etc/crypttab line:
myvolume /dev/sda1 none fido2-device=auto
See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching
/etc/crypttab line.
Added in version 248.
--fido2-credential-algorithm=STRING
Specify COSE algorithm used in credential generation. The default value is "es256". Supported values are "es256",
"rs256" and "eddsa".
"es256" denotes ECDSA over NIST P-256 with SHA-256. "rs256" denotes 2048-bit RSA with PKCS#1.5 padding and
SHA-256. "eddsa" denotes EDDSA over Curve25519 with SHA-512.
Note that your authenticator may choose not to support some algorithms.
Added in version 251.
--fido2-salt-file=PATH
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, specifies the path to a file or an AF_UNIX socket from which we should
read the salt value to be used in the HMAC operation performed by the FIDO2 security token. If this option is not
specified, the salt will be randomly generated.
Added in version 257.
--fido2-parameters-in-header=BOOL
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to store FIDO2 parameters in a token in the LUKS2
superblock. Defaults to "yes". If set to "no", the fido2-cid= option has to be specified manually in the
respective /etc/crypttab line along with a key file. See crypttab(5) for details.
Added in version 257.
--fido2-with-client-pin=BOOL
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require the user to enter a PIN when unlocking the
volume (the FIDO2 "clientPin" feature). Defaults to "yes". (Note: this setting is without effect if the security
token does not support the "clientPin" feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling it.)
Added in version 249.
--fido2-with-user-presence=BOOL
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require the user to verify presence (tap the token,
the FIDO2 "up" feature) when unlocking the volume. Defaults to "yes". (Note: this setting is without effect if
the security token does not support the "up" feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling it.)
Added in version 249.
--fido2-with-user-verification=BOOL
When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require user verification when unlocking the volume
(the FIDO2 "uv" feature). Defaults to "no". (Note: this setting is without effect if the security token does not
support the "uv" feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling it.)
Added in version 249.
TPM2 ENROLLMENT
The following options are understood that may be used to enroll TPM2 devices:
--tpm2-device=PATH
Enroll a TPM2 security chip. Expects a device node path referring to the TPM2 chip (e.g. /dev/tpmrm0).
Alternatively the special value "auto" may be specified, in order to automatically determine the device node of a
currently discovered TPM2 device (of which there must be exactly one). The special value "list" may be used to
enumerate all suitable TPM2 devices currently discovered.
In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled TPM2 security chip, specify the tpm2-device= option in the
respective /etc/crypttab line:
myvolume /dev/sda1 none tpm2-device=auto
See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching
/etc/crypttab line.
Use --tpm2-pcrs= (see below) to configure which TPM2 PCR indexes to bind the enrollment to.
Added in version 248.
--tpm2-device-key=PATH
Enroll a TPM2 security chip using its public key. Expects a path referring to the TPM2 public key in TPM2B_PUBLIC
format. This cannot be used with --tpm2-device=, as it performs the same operation, but without connecting to the
TPM2 security chip; instead the enrollment is calculated using the provided TPM2 key. This is useful in
situations where the TPM2 security chip is not available at the time of enrollment.
The key, in most cases, should be the Storage Root Key (SRK) from a local TPM2 security chip. If a key from a
different handle (not the SRK) is used, you must specify its handle index using --tpm2-seal-key-handle=.
The systemd-tpm2-setup.service(8) service writes the SRK to /run/systemd/tpm2-srk-public-key.tpm2b_public
automatically during boot, in the correct format.
Alternatively, you may use systemd-analyze srk to retrieve the SRK from the TPM2 security chip explicitly. See
systemd-analyze(1) for details. Example:
systemd-analyze srk > srk.tpm2b_public
Added in version 255.
--tpm2-seal-key-handle=HANDLE
Configures which parent key to use for sealing, using the TPM handle (index) of the key. This is used to "seal"
(encrypt) a secret and must be used later to "unseal" (decrypt) the secret. Expects a hexadecimal 32bit integer,
optionally prefixed with "0x". Allowable values are any handle index in the persistent
("0x81000000"-"0x81ffffff") or transient ("0x80000000"-"0x80ffffff") ranges. Since transient handles are lost
after a TPM reset, and may be flushed during TPM context switching, they should not be used except for very
specific use cases, e.g. testing.
The default is the Storage Root Key (SRK) handle index "0x81000001". A value of 0 will use the default. For the
SRK handle, a new key will be created and stored in the TPM if one does not already exist; for any other handle,
the key must already exist in the TPM at the specified handle index.
This should not be changed unless you know what you are doing.
Added in version 255.
--tpm2-pcrs=PCR[+PCR...]
Configures the TPM2 PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers) to bind to when enrollment is requested via
--tpm2-device=. Takes a list of PCR entries, where each entry starts with a name or numeric index in the range
0...23, optionally followed by ":" and a hash algorithm name (specifying the PCR bank), optionally followed by
"=" and a hash digest value. Multiple PCR entries are separated by "+". If an empty string is specified, binds
the enrollment to no PCRs at all (this is also the default, if this option is not used). See the table above for
a list of available PCRs.
Example: --tpm2-pcrs=boot-loader-code+platform-config+boot-loader-config specifies that PCR registers 4, 1, and 5
should be used.
Example: --tpm2-pcrs=7:sha256 specifies that PCR register 7 from the SHA256 bank should be used.
Example: --tpm2-pcrs=4:sha1=3a3f780f11a4b49969fcaa80cd6e3957c33b2275 specifies that PCR register 4 from the SHA1
bank should be used, and a hash digest value of 3a3f780f11a4b49969fcaa80cd6e3957c33b2275 will be used instead of
reading the current PCR value.
Added in version 248.
--tpm2-with-pin=BOOL
When enrolling a TPM2 device, controls whether to require the user to enter a PIN when unlocking the volume in
addition to PCR binding, based on TPM2 policy authentication. Defaults to "no". Despite being called PIN, any
character can be used, not just numbers.
Note that incorrect PIN entry when unlocking increments the TPM dictionary attack lockout mechanism, and may lock
out users for a prolonged time, depending on its configuration. The lockout mechanism is a global property of the
TPM, systemd-cryptenroll does not control or configure the lockout mechanism. You may use tpm2-tss tools to
inspect or configure the dictionary attack lockout, with tpm2_getcap(1) and tpm2_dictionarylockout(1) commands,
respectively.
Added in version 251.
--tpm2-public-key=PATH, --tpm2-public-key-pcrs=PCR[+PCR...], --tpm2-signature=PATH
Configures a TPM2 signed PCR policy to bind encryption to. The --tpm2-public-key= option accepts a path to a PEM
encoded RSA public key, to bind the encryption to. If this is not specified explicitly, but a file
tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem exists in one of the directories /etc/systemd/, /run/systemd/, /usr/lib/systemd/
(searched in this order), it is automatically used. The --tpm2-public-key-pcrs= option takes a list of TPM2 PCR
indexes to bind to (same syntax as --tpm2-pcrs= described above). If not specified, defaults to 11 (i.e. this
binds the policy to any unified kernel image for which a PCR signature can be provided).
Note the difference between --tpm2-pcrs= and --tpm2-public-key-pcrs=: the former binds decryption to the current,
specific PCR values; the latter binds decryption to any set of PCR values for which a signature by the specified
public key can be provided. The latter is hence more useful in scenarios where software updates shall be possible
without losing access to all previously encrypted LUKS2 volumes. Like with --tpm2-pcrs=, names defined in the
table above can also be used to specify the registers, for instance
--tpm2-public-key-pcrs=boot-loader-code+system-identity.
The --tpm2-signature= option takes a path to a TPM2 PCR signature file as generated by the systemd-measure(1)
tool. If this is not specified explicitly, a suitable signature file tpm2-pcr-signature.json is searched for in
/etc/systemd/, /run/systemd/, /usr/lib/systemd/ (in this order) and used. If a signature file is specified or
found it is used to verify if the volume can be unlocked with it given the current PCR state, before the new slot
is written to disk. This is intended as safety net to ensure that access to a volume is not lost if a public key
is enrolled for which no valid signature for the current PCR state is available. If the supplied signature does
not unlock the current PCR state and public key combination, no slot is enrolled and the operation will fail. If
no signature file is specified or found no such safety verification is done.
Added in version 252.
--tpm2-pcrlock=PATH
Configures a TPM2 pcrlock policy to bind encryption to. Expects a path to a pcrlock policy file as generated by
the systemd-pcrlock(8) tool. If a TPM2 device is enrolled and this option is not used but a file pcrlock.json is
found in /run/systemd/ or /var/lib/systemd/ it is automatically used. Assign an empty string to turn this
behaviour off.
Added in version 255.
OTHER OPTIONS
The following additional options are understood:
--wipe-slot=SLOT[,SLOT...]
Wipes one or more LUKS2 key slots. Takes a comma separated list of numeric slot indexes, or the special strings
"all" (for wiping all key slots), "empty" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by an empty passphrase),
"password" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a traditional passphrase), "recovery" (for wiping all
key slots that are unlocked by a recovery key), "pkcs11" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a PKCS#11
token), "fido2" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a FIDO2 token), "tpm2" (for wiping all key slots
that are unlocked by a TPM2 chip), or any combination of these strings or numeric indexes, in which case all
slots matching either are wiped. As safety precaution an operation that wipes all slots without exception (so
that the volume cannot be unlocked at all anymore, unless the volume key is known) is refused.
This switch may be used alone, in which case only the requested wipe operation is executed. It may also be used
in combination with any of the enrollment options listed above, in which case the enrollment is completed first,
and only when successful the wipe operation executed — and the newly added slot is always excluded from the
wiping. Combining enrollment and slot wiping may thus be used to update existing enrollments:
systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=tpm2 --tpm2-device=auto --unlock-tpm2-device=auto
The above command will enroll the TPM2 chip, and then wipe all previously created TPM2 enrollments on the LUKS2
volume, leaving only the newly created one. Combining wiping and enrollment may also be used to replace
enrollments of different types, for example for changing from a PKCS#11 enrollment to a FIDO2 one:
systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=pkcs11 --fido2-device=auto
Or for replacing an enrolled empty password by TPM2:
systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=empty --tpm2-device=auto
Added in version 248.
--list-devices
Show a list of candidate block devices this command may operate on. Specifically, this enumerates block devices
currently present that contain a LUKS superblock, and shows their device node paths along with any of their
symlinks. The devices must implement the hmac-secret extension to be usable.
Added in version 257.
-h, --help
Print a short help text and exit.
--version
Print a short version string and exit.
--no-pager
Do not pipe output into a pager.
CREDENTIALS
systemd-cryptenroll supports the service credentials logic as implemented by
ImportCredential=/LoadCredential=/SetCredential= (see systemd.exec(5) for details). The following credentials are
used when passed in:
cryptenroll.passphrase, cryptenroll.new-passphrase
May contain the passphrase to unlock the volume with/to newly enroll.
Added in version 256.
cryptenroll.tpm2-pin, cryptenroll.new-tpm2-pin
May contain the TPM2 PIN to unlock the volume with/to newly enroll.
Added in version 256.
cryptenroll.fido2-pin
If a FIDO2 token is enrolled this may contain the PIN of the token.
Added in version 256.
cryptenroll.pkcs11-pin
If a PKCS#11 token is enrolled this may contain the PIN of the token.
Added in version 256.
EXIT STATUS
On success, 0 is returned, a non-zero failure code otherwise.
EXAMPLES
crypttab(5) and systemd-measure(1) contain various examples employing systemd-cryptenroll.
SEE ALSO
systemd(1), systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8), crypttab(5), cryptsetup(8), systemd-measure(1)
NOTES
1. UAPI.7 Linux TPM PCR Registry
https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/linux_tpm_pcr_registry/
systemd 259.5 SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)